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A native Spanish-speaker with a fifth-grade education who asserted self-
defense during his guilty plea hearing, even after his trial counsel assured the 
court that they had discussed imperfect self-defense, did not knowingly plead 
guilty to murder. His assertions of self-defense negated an essential element of 
murder. And no one resolved his self-defense assertions on the record.  
With these facts, Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga’s petition for postconviction 
relief should have survived summary judgment. But it did not. This Court should 
reverse the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the State.  
The State disagrees. It argues that Mr. Arriaga’s argument on appeal is not 
preserved and that Mr. Arriaga’s plea met all the constitutional requirements for 
a valid guilty plea. But none of the State’s arguments have merit.  
1. Mr. Arriaga’s Guilty Plea Claim Is Preserved 
The State argues that Mr. Arriaga’s claim that his plea was not knowing or 
voluntary was not preserved in the district court. It asserts that the plea issue was 
raised for the first time in Mr. Arriaga’s summary judgment opposition. But the 
State is incorrect. 
In his Second Amended Petition, Mr. Arriaga claimed that his plea was not 
knowing or voluntary. In that petition, Mr. Arriaga asserted that “during the plea 
colloquy, [Mr. Arriaga] told the Court that he acted in self-defense, manifesting 
that he did not agree that he had committed the crime of murder.” (R. 448.) 
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Accordingly, he listed as a ground for relief that his “conviction was obtained by a 
plea of guilty that was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.” (R. 
450.)   
The State argues that Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea claim in his petition was not 
specific enough; it seems to argue that Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea issue was not 
preserved because the State did not understand the full nature of Mr. Arriaga’s 
legal arguments until the summary judgment stage. The State seems to advocate 
for a higher pleading standard than is required. Postconviction petitioners are 
only required to state in their petitions “in plain and concise terms, all of the facts 
that form the basis of the petitioner’s claim to relief.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(3). 
Petitioners are not allowed to “set forth argument or citations or discuss 
authorities in the petition.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(f).  
The pleading standards for postconviction petitions are like those in civil 
complaints. Civil complaints “must contain a short and plain . . . statement of the 
claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Utah’s 
pleading standard is a “liberal notice pleading standard,” where “the plaintiff 
must only give the defendant fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” City of 
Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 35, 233 P.3d 
461 (quotation omitted).  
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In this case, Mr. Arriaga stated in “plain and concise terms,” without 
“argument or citations or . . . authorities,” that his guilty plea was not knowing 
and voluntary because he asserted self-defense during the plea colloquy. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65C(d)(3), (f); R. 448, 450. He gave the State fair notice of his guilty-plea 
issue.  
Mr. Arriaga certainly fleshed out his guilty-plea issue in his opposition to 
the State’s summary judgment motion. He had to.  The summary judgment stage 
demands thorough analysis. He articulated how a claim of self-defense renders a 
guilty plea to murder not knowing because it negates an essential element of the 
plea. (R. 1109–11.) He discussed how trial counsel’s and the district court’s 
discussion on the record about the elements of murder did not resolve his self-
defense assertions. (R. 1110–11.) And he explained how imperfect self-defense 
could apply to his situation. (Id.) But all these discussions boil down to one 
simple issue, the one Mr. Arriaga summarized in his petition: his guilty plea was 
not knowing or voluntary because he asserted self-defense during his plea 
colloquy.  
The preservation rule requires a party “to raise the issue in the trial court in 
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” State v. 
Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d 1141 (quotation omitted). “To properly preserve 
an issue at the district court, the following must take place: (1) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party 
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” O'Dea v. Olea, 
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2009 UT 46, ¶ 18, 217 P.3d 704 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arriaga satisfied all 
three factors.  
Mr. Arriaga raised his guilty-plea issue in a timely matter: in his petition 
and in his opposition to the State’s summary judgment motion. (R. 448, 450, 
1108–1112.) He discussed the issue specifically in his opposition, he supported his 
issue with legal authority, and the State replied to it. (R. 1108–12, 1202.) Mr. 
Arriaga then argued at length in the summary judgment hearing that his plea was 
not knowing or voluntary. (R. 1323–41.) And the district court rejected that 
argument in its order; it concluded that all “the constitutional prerequisites for a 
valid guilty plea were satisfied in Mr. Arriaga’s case.” (R. 1270.) The district court 
had the opportunity to thoroughly assess and consider Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea 
issue.  
The preservation doctrine prevents appellants from raising issues on 
appeal that were inadequately raised in the district court; the doctrine promotes 
judicial efficiency by allowing district courts to correct errors and make reasoned 
decisions before the issues are brought to the appellate courts, and the doctrine 
prevents appellants from surprising appellees with arguments on appeal never 
before raised.  
Addressing the merits of this case upholds the purposes of the preservation 
doctrine. Mr. Arriaga gave the district court evidence and legal authority 
supporting his guilty-plea issue in his summary judgment opposition, and he 
argued about his issue at length in the summary judgment hearing. (R. 1108–
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1112, 1323–41.) The district court was well aware of Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea 
issue before it issued its order. Likewise, the State was well aware of Mr. Arriaga’s 
guilty-plea issue during the summary judgment proceedings and had an 
opportunity to respond. Mr. Arriaga’s guilty-plea issue in his appeal comes as no 
surprise to the State.  
  
2. Mr. Arriaga’s Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary 
Mr. Arriaga’s guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Twice during the 
plea hearing he made self-defense claims that negated an essential element of the 
murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not understand the 
proceedings.  
The State’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. In fact, the State 
does not address the case law that holds that a defendant’s statements during a 
plea colloquy that negate an element of a crime can render a plea not knowing or 
voluntary. See United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(vacating guilty plea when the defendant persistently disavowed responsibility for 
a certain amount of drugs during the colloquy, and the amount of drugs was an 
essential element of the crime); United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 
761, 771 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Spanish-speaking defendant did not 
understand the nature of the conspiracy charges against him when he made 
statements during his plea hearing that showed he did not understand the 
concept of conspiracy or the specific acts to which he was pleading guilty); United 
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States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020, 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Spanish-speaking defendant did not understand charges he was pleading to when 
he made statements during the colloquy that showed he was confused and the 
district court did not clear up his confusion); People v. Ramirez, 839 N.Y.S.2d 
327, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding that plea was not voluntary when 
defendant made statements during the colloquy that negated his plea and district 
court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry); State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 375 
(Utah 1996) (holding that even though defendant acknowledged at one point he 
had the appropriate mental state, he made repeated comments that negated his 
admission and consequently did not admit to the requisite mental state). 
Instead, the State incorrectly asserts that the absence of self-defense is not 
an essential element of murder, citing an old Utah Supreme Court case (State v. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)) for support. But much more recently, this Court 
held that “[a] necessary element of a murder conviction is the absence of 
affirmative defenses.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 45, 192 P.3d 867 (emphasis 
added). “It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of an 
affirmative defense once the defense is put into issue.” Id. (quotation omitted). 
Mr. Arriaga put the affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense at issue when he 
twice asserted self-defense during the plea colloquy. Consequently, “the absence 
of affirmative defenses [was] an element of murder” in Mr. Arriaga’s case. Id.  
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The State also asserts that the plea affidavit and Mr. Arriaga’s one-worded 
answers to the district court’s questions rendered the plea knowing and 
voluntary. But the plea affidavit did not mention self-defense. (R. 79–89.) And 
Mr. Arriaga’s monosyllabic answers to the district court’s questions are far less 
indicative of his understanding of the plea than his multi-worded assertions in 
his native Spanish that he acted in self-defense.  
Finally, the State improperly relies on Mr. Arriaga’s experience with the 
criminal justice system to assume that Mr. Arriaga knew what he was doing in 
this case. The State argues that because Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty in 2003 and 
2004 to misdemeanors and third-degree felonies that he knew how his first-
degree murder plea would pan out. But that claim is entirely speculative. The 
record does not give any indication about what type of representation Mr. Arriaga 
received in those cases. And those pleas occurred about seven years before the 
plea in this case, and those earlier pleas were to crimes far less serious. Assuming 
Mr. Arriaga knew what he was doing because he had pleaded guilty seven years 
before is a speculative leap this Court should not take.  
This Court need not worry that a ruling in Mr. Arriaga’s favor would open 
the floodgates for other criminal defendants to challenge their guilty pleas. This 
case presents a unique situation where a non-English-speaking defendant made 
self-defense claims during the plea colloquy that were not resolved by the district 
court or trial counsel.  
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Had anyone explained on the record the implications of and burden of 
proof for the self-defense claim, had the plea affidavit included information about 
self-defense, had Mr. Arriaga recanted his self-defense claim—had any of those 
things happened, Mr. Arriaga’s postconviction appeal would not be meritorious. 
But none of those things happened. And because they did not, Mr. Arriaga’s 
guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Mr. Arriaga respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the judgment of the district court and the Court of Appeals.   
Conclusion 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga, this Court 
should conclude that Mr. Arriaga’s plea was not knowing or voluntary and was 
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga requests that this Court 
reverse the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the State.  
DATED this 9th day of May 2019.   
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